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R
eserve requirements have traditionally
been viewed as a key instrument of mone-
tary policy. Indeed, textbook discussions
of monetary policy typically center on the role
of reserve requirements in determining the size
of the money multiplier and the magnitude of
bank credit expansion. In recent years, however,
there has been a significant decline in the use of
reserve requirements in the United States and in
other industrialized countries. Many countries
have made substantial cuts in the level of reserve
requirements, and some countries have elimi-
nated reserve requirements altogether. 
The diminished role of reserve requirements
stems from several developments. One factor is
a change in the way that central banks imple-
ment monetary policy. Over the past decade,
many central banks have shifted their emphasis
from short-run control of reserves to control
over short-term interest rates. While reserve
requirements are essential to a reserves strategy,
they play a less important role in an interest-rate
strategy. A second reason for reduced reliance
on reserve requirements is the view that such
requirements serve as a tax on depository insti-
tutions that puts them at a competitive disadvan-
tage relative to other financial institutions. And
third, even where reserve requirements have not
been reduced formally, their effectiveness has
been reduced by financial innovations. For
example, the spread of deposit “sweep accounts”
in the United States over the past two years has
reduced the level of required reserve balances to
its lowest level in 30 years. 
The declining use of reserve requirements has
important implications for monetary policy. First,
in the absence of a binding level of reserve
requirements, the demand for central bank bal-
ances is no longer determined by the public’s
demand for transactions deposits and term
deposits but, instead, depends on depository
institutions’ need to hold balances for clearing
and settlement purposes. This means that there
is a direct connection between the payments
system and monetary policy and implies that
institutional changes in the payments system,
such as new clearing and settlement methods,
may require corresponding changes in monetary
policy operating procedures. Second, the absence
of binding reserve requirements may lead to
increased volatility of short-term interest rates
and impair the ability of central banks to imple-
ment monetary policy. If so, central banks may
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this volatility. 
This article, the first of two, examines the
implications for monetary policy of the declin-
ing use of reserve requirements. The first section
discusses the historical role of reserve require-
ments and documents their recent decline in the
United States and other industrialized countries.
The second section shows how a reduction in
reserve requirements can lead to an environment
in which monetary policy issues and payments
system issues are directly linked. The third section
discusses how a reduction in reserve requirements
potentially increases the volatility of short-term
interest rates. The companion article, to be pub-
lished in a future issue of the Review, looks at
three countries that have eliminated reserve
requirements—Canada, the United Kingdom,
and New Zealand—and asks whether adapta-
tions to monetary policy procedures in those
countries could be extended to the United States.
I. THE DECLINING USE OF
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
While reserve requirements have been a part
of banking systems for many years, their role has
evolved due to changes in the financial system
and monetary policy operating procedures. Once
viewed as essential in controlling the creation of
money and credit and providing financial stabil-
ity, reserve requirements have come to be seen
as a useful supplement to other instruments.
As the rationale for reserve requirements has
weakened, their use has diminished. In recent
years, many central banks have reduced reserve
requirements, and, in some countries, reserve
requirements have been eliminated. 
What are reserve requirements?
In the United States and many other countries,
banks and other depository institutions are
required to maintain a fraction of their deposit
liabilities in the form of reserves—required
reserve balances held at the central bank or vault
cash held at the institution. While reserve require-
ments typically apply to demand or transactions
accounts, savings accounts and other short-term
bank liabilities may also be subject to reserve
requirements.
1 
Generally, depository institutions do not have
to meet reserve requirements on a daily basis
but only, on average, over a period of one or
more weeks. For example, in the United States,
reserves are maintained over a two-week period
based on the level of transactions deposits also
averaged over a two-week period.
2 Additionally,
in the United States, depository institutions are
allowed to carry over part of a reserve deficiency
or surplus into the next maintenance period.
3 
The Federal Reserve, like many central banks,
does not pay interest on reserve balances. Thus,
to the extent that reserve requirements force
depository institutions to hold higher balances
than necessary for normal business purposes,
reserve requirements constitute a tax on deposi-
tory institutions. These institutions cannot avoid
this tax by holding fewer balances than required
because there are monetary penalties for reserve
deficiencies. In the United States, for example,
depository institutions can be penalized if reserve
balances are negative on a daily basis or if
reserves are deficient over a two-week mainte-
nance period.
4
The changing rationale for reserve
requirements
While reserve requirements have existed in
one form or another for many years, their
rationale has changed over time (Feinman).
Initially,  reserve requirements were supposed to
provide stability to the financial system by
decreasing the likelihood that individual banks
6 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYwould experience liquidity problems from deposi-
tor withdrawals. In the United States, this role
became less important with the development of
bank clearinghouse facilities in the latter part of
the 19th century and the Federal Reserve’s dis-
count window in 1913.
Subsequently, reserve requirements came to
be viewed as an essential means of controlling
bank credit-creation. During the 1930s, for exam-
ple, the Federal Reserve used changes in reserve
requirements in an attempt to alter bank credit
expansion. More recently, during the credit con-
trol program in 1980, the Federal Reserve imposed
marginal reserve requirements on certain bank
liabilities in an attempt to curtail the growth of
bank credit. And reserve requirements were low-
ered in 1990, in part, to stimulate bank lending
(Feinman). 
The use of reserve requirements to control
bank credit has become less important over time,
however. One reason is that reserve requirement
changes are a relatively blunt instrument for
changing reserve availability as compared to the
use of open-market operations. That is, changes
in reserve supply can be accomplished more
easily and more quickly through open market
operations. A more important factor has been the
evolution of the financial system and the smaller
role played by banks in credit markets. In this
new environment, controlling bank credit may
no longer be sufficient to affect overall credit
extension, given the growing availability of sub-
stitutes for bank credit. Moreover, controlling
only bank credit may place banks at a serious
competitive disadvantage relative to other lenders.
A third important rationale for reserve require-
ments has been control over the supply of money.
The level of reserve requirements is an impor-
tant component of the multiplier relationship
connecting the quantity of reserves provided by
the central bank to the quantity of broader mone-
tary aggregates believed to influence spending
in the economy. During the late 1970s and early
1980s when the Federal Reserve and other central
banks emphasized close control over reserves as
a means of reducing inflationary pressures,
reserve requirements played an important part
in monetary policy discussions. More recently,
however, as central banks have moved away
from reserves targeting, issues concerning reserve
requirements have become less prominent in
monetary policy discussions.
Currently, in many countries reserve require-
ments are seen as a useful, but no longer essential,
part of monetary policy.
5 Many central banks
now implement monetary policy chiefly by
influencing the level of short-term interest rates,
pushing rates up to reduce inflationary pressures
and moving rates down to offset weak economic
activity. In this framework, reserve requirements
play a secondary role to open-market operations
in the implementation of monetary policy. Indeed,
the main function of reserve requirements in this
environment is to provide a stable demand for
reserves which makes it easier for the central
bank to influence the level of short-term interest
rates (Weiner).
6
The diminished use of reserve
requirements
 Reserve requirements have been reduced in
many major industrialized countries in recent
years. Several countries now operate monetary
policy in an environment in which reserve
requirements are zero or so low that they are no
longer binding on the behavior of depository
institutions.
The trend toward lower reserve requirements
is widespread (Table 1). Since 1990, for exam-
ple, the Federal Reserve has reduced reserve
requirements twice. In December 1990, elimi-
nation of the 3 percent reserve requirement on
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1996 7nontransaction accounts reduced the level of
required reserves by $11.5 billion, a cut of al-
most one-third (Feinman). Then, in April 1992,
the Federal Reserve cut reserve requirements on
transactions deposits from 12 percent to 10 per-
cent, reducing required reserves by an additional
$8.5 billion. Germany, France, and Japan have
also lowered reserve requirements in recent
years. And some countries have gone even fur-
ther. In 1994, Canada eliminated reserve re-
quirements, joining the United Kingdom and
New Zealand, which had previously moved to
abolish reserve requirements.
7
This trend toward lower reserve requirements
stems from three developments. The first, noted
above, is growing acceptance of the view that
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the next two years, culminating in a zero overall reserve ratio in July 1994. 
Note: Figures shown are highest marginal ratios. In some cases, applicable marginal ratios may vary according to spe-
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Bank of Canada; Bank of England; Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
8 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYimplementation of monetary policy. Canada, the
United Kingdom, and New Zealand, for exam-
ple, have demonstrated it is possible to pursue
sound monetary policies without relying on
reserve requirements as a policy instrument.
The second factor leading to diminished use of
reserve requirements is the view that such require-
ments are a serious distortion in an increasingly
competitive financial world. Reserve require-
ments are generally applied to a narrow range of
liabilities of depository institutions, and reserve
balances typically pay no interest. Thus, reserve
requirements constitute a tax which differen-
tially affects depository institutions relative to
other financial institutions. A common theme
across countries that have lowered reserve
requirements is that such reductions remove an
inequitable tax on the banking system, improv-
ing bank profitability and allowing banks to
compete on more even terms with other finan-
cial institutions.
 The third factor underlying the reduced role
of reserve requirements is financial market inno-
vation. Even where reserve requirements have
not been formally cut, their effectiveness has
been eroded by financial innovation. This is
particularly evident in the United States. For
many years, depository institutions in the United
States have attempted to evade reserve require-
ments by creating new types of deposit-like
Chart 1
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1996 9liabilities that are not subject to reserve require-
ments. By shifting the composition of liabilities
from reservable deposits to nonreservable liabili-
ties, these institutions have lowered their required
reserves even without a formal cut in reserve
requirements. Examples include the develop-
ment of certificates of deposit (CDs), Eurodollar
borrowing,  repurchase agreements, and, most
recently, “sweep accounts.”
8
The combined effects of legal reserve require-
ment changes and financial innovations have
had a significant impact on U.S. depository insti-
tutions (Chart 1). The top line in this chart shows
total required reserves of depository institutions.
The bottom two lines show how institutions
meet reserve requirements, by holding vault cash
and by holding required reserve balances at the
Federal Reserve. Especially striking in the chart
are the two formal cuts in reserve requirements
in 1990 and 1992 and the further decline in
required reserves over the past two years. The
most recent decline is largely attributable to the
widespread use by depository institutions of
so-called “sweep accounts,” in which funds are
automatically transferred from reservable deposit
accounts, such as demand deposits and other
checkable deposits, to nonreservable accounts,
such as money market deposit accounts. Such a
transfer lowers the deposit base for the calcula-
Chart 2
CUMULATIVE SWEEPS OF TRANSACTION DEPOSITS INTO 
MONEY MARKET DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS
Note: Based on monthly averages of initial amounts.
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10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYtion of reserve requirements. The use of sweep
accounts by banks began modestly in 1994 but
has increased considerably since the spring of
1995 (Chart 2).
9 
Particularly dramatic is the reduction in the
size of required reserve balances held at the
Federal Reserve (Chart 1). These balances,
which represent that part of required reserves
satisfied by holding funds in reserve accounts at
the Federal Reserve, are now at their lowest
level in over 30 years. Increasingly, depository
institutions are able to meet reserve require-
ments entirely through their holding of vault
cash rather than by holding reserve accounts at
the Federal Reserve. Indeed, while approximately
26,000 depository institutions in the United States
currently have reservable liabilities, only about
2,000 hold required reserve balances at the Fed-
eral Reserve. 
II. THE PAYMENTS SYSTEM AND
MONETARY POLICY
 The declining use of reserve requirements has
important implications for the relationship be-
tween monetary policy and the payments sys-
tem. In a traditional banking system where
reserve requirements are binding on depository
institutions, short-term interest rates are deter-
mined by the demand for and supply of central
bank reserves. In this framework, the structure
of the payments system has only a minor influ-














ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1996 11little bearing on the conduct of monetary policy.
However, in a world in which reserve require-
ments are no longer binding, the demand for
central bank balances is no longer based on the
demand for reserves but depends on the need of
depository institutions to make payments. These
payments include clearing and settlement trans-
actions with other depository institutions and
transactions with the government. In this envi-
ronment, monetary policy operating procedures
and the payments system are directly linked, and
ongoing changes in the payments system may
require corresponding changes in monetary pol-
icy procedures.
Monetary policy when reserve
requirements are binding 
Today, a majority of central banks still operate
in a world in which reserve requirements are
high enough to influence the behavior of many
depository institutions. In this framework, the
short-term or overnight interest rate is deter-
mined by the demand for and supply of reserves
(Figure 1). The demand for reserves D comes
primarily from the need of depository institu-
tions to hold reserves to meet reserve require-
ments. This demand depends on the public’s
choice of the amount of transactions deposits to
hold at depository institutions.
10 In addition, in-
stitutions may hold a small amount of excess
reserves for precautionary purposes to prevent
deficiencies in their reserve account.
 The demand for reserves shown in Figure 1 is
inversely related to the short-term interest rate
for two reasons. First, higher interest rates cause
depositors to shift funds out of transactions
accounts into higher yielding, nonreservable
assets, reducing the demand for required reserves.
Second, the demand for excess reserves is also
somewhat sensitive to market interest rates.
Since reserve balances generally pay no interest,
institutions must trade off the cost of holding
idle balances against the cost of penalties imposed
by the central bank for reserve deficiencies. As
market rates rise, the cost of holding idle funds
increases, inducing institutions to hold fewer
excess reserves. 
While the demand for reserves depends on the
behavior of depository institutions, the supply
of reserves S is largely determined by the central
bank through its open market operations and
discount or lending facility.
11 In addition, reserve
supply is also influenced by nonpolicy factors,
such as flows of funds into and out of govern-
ment accounts at the central bank. For example,
when the government collects more tax revenue
and transfers these funds to the central bank, its
balances at the central bank rise while deposi-
tory institutions’ reserves fall. Similarly, increased
government expenditures reduce the government’s
central bank account and increase the supply of
reserves. 
In this framework, monetary policy is imple-
mented by using central bank control over the
supply of reserves to affect short-term interest
rates. The central bank can change the stance of
monetary policy by using open-market opera-
tions to shift the supply curve S in Figure 1. By
reducing or increasing the supply of reserves
available to the banking system, the central bank
can push interest rates higher or lower.
In the traditional reserves framework, mone-
tary policy is largely independent of the structure
of the payments system. When reserve require-
ments are high enough to be binding on deposi-
tory institutions, these institutions are forced to
hold more central bank balances than are actually
needed for payments purposes. That is, the de-
mand for reserves depends primarily on the legal
reserve requirement and not the need of institu-
tions to make payments. Indeed, of the total
demand for reserves, only the demand for excess
reserves is likely to be affected by payments
12 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYsystem changes.
12 Consequently, institutional
changes in the payments system, such as new
clearing and settlement procedures that reduce
the need for central bank balances, are likely to
have little effect on the reserves market. Thus,
in a reserves framework, changes in the pay-
ments system do not affect the central bank’s
ability to influence short-term interest rates by
controlling the supply of reserves.
Monetary policy when reserve
requirements are not binding
A world where reserve requirements are not
binding requires changes in this policy frame-
work. For simplicity, consider a situation in
which reserve requirements are zero. Without
reserve requirements, strictly speaking, there is
no demand for reserves. In this case it is no
longer possible to think in terms of a model in
which the short-term interest rate is determined
by the demand for and supply of reserves. 
Even in the absence of reserve requirements,
however, there is likely to be a continuing de-
mand for central bank balances. This demand
arises from the need of financial institutions to
make payments. That is, even without formal
reserve requirements, the banking system will
generally hold balances at the central bank to
clear and settle transactions and to transact busi-
ness with the government.
13 This demand for
settlement balances will depend on institutional














ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1996 13penalties that the central bank charges for over-
drafts in these settlement accounts. Generally
speaking, the higher the overdraft penalties and
the greater the degree of uncertainty about pay-
ments flows, the higher the level of settlement
balances institutions are likely to hold. 
The existence of settlement balances held at
the central bank provides a conceptual basis for
monetary policy in a world without reserve
requirements.
14 As long as there is a demand for
settlement balances, central banks can influence
short-term interest rates by altering the supply
of these balances (Figure 2).
15 That is, monetary
policy can operate through short-term interest
rates even in the absence of reserve require-
ments. For example, to push interest rates up, a
central bank can reduce the supply of settlement
balances by selling securities in an open market
operation. This action would force banks to bid for
additional settlement balances in the interbank
market or sell assets to obtain more balances,
causing short-term rates to rise. Similarly, to push
rates down, the central bank can use open market
purchases of securities to increase the supply of
settlement balances. To the extent that it is costly
to hold excess balances, institutions will tend to
dispose of excess balances, forcing short-term
rates down.
At the same time, there are some important
practical difficulties in using settlement bal-
ances instead of reserve balances as the fulcrum
for monetary policy. The chief problem is in mod-
eling financial institutions’ demand for these
balances. When reserve requirements are bind-
ing, the demand for reserves is largely derived
from the public’s desire to hold transactions
accounts at depository institutions. In this case,
changes in the public’s demand for money are
the principal factor causing a change in the
demand for reserves. In contrast, when reserve
requirements are not binding, an institution’s
decision to hold settlement balances is likely to
bear little relation to the public’s demand for
money. Rather, the demand for these balances
will depend on institutional features of the pay-
ments system affecting the timing of payments
flows into and out of settlement accounts. 
Changes in payments practices or the structure
of the payments system are likely to alter the
amounts of settlement balances that institutions
maintain. These changes have implications for
monetary policy to the extent that they cause
shifts in the demand for central bank balances.
For example, the development of improved bal-
ance monitoring capabilities by depository insti-
tutions may reduce the degree of uncertainty
about inflows and outflows from settlement
accounts. If so, institutions may reduce the size
of their desired balances. This would cause the
demand curve for settlement balances D in Fig-
ure 2 to shift to the left over time. Similarly,
mergers in the banking industry could reduce the
desired amounts of these balances to the extent
that more transactions are settled internally within
the banking organization rather than being set-
tled at the central bank. 
The analysis to this point has assumed that
reserve requirements are zero. But, in fact, the
analysis will hold in any situation in which
reserve requirements are so low as to be non-
binding. Central banks need not eliminate reserve
requirements, but only lower them to nonbind-
ing levels, to find themselves operating in this
new environment. 
Without a good idea of the factors affecting
the demand for settlement balances, a central
bank may have difficulty in implementing
monetary policy. That is, it may become more
difficult to achieve control over short-term
interest rates when the demand for central bank
balances is derived from payments needs rather
than from the demand for transactions balances.
More fundamentally, in a world where reserve
14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYrequirements are no longer effective, there is an
important linkage between the payments system
and monetary policy that does not exist when
reserve requirements are binding on depository
institutions. The existence of this linkage im-
plies that ongoing changes in the payments system
that alter the demand for clearing and settlement
balances may require continuing changes in
monetary policy operating procedures to main-
tain the effectiveness of monetary policy.
III.RESERVE REQUIREMENTS AND
INTEREST RATE VOLATILITY
A second implication of reduced reserve re-
quirements is the potential for greater volatility
of short-term interest rates. To the extent that
increased volatility impairs the implementation
of monetary policy, central banks may have to
take measures to limit volatility. In the United
States, institutional changes by the Federal
Reserve and adjustments by depository institu-
tions have helped limit interest rate volatility as
reserve balances have declined. Moreover, reserve
requirements remain binding for a number of
institutions. However, continuing financial inno-
vation could push the United States closer to a
world where reserve requirements are no longer
effective and interest rate volatility is a more
pressing concern for monetary policy.
Causes and consequences of greater
volatility
Currently, many central banks conduct day-










ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1996 15a short-term interest rate around a target value or
by maintaining the rate within a narrow range.
16
In a reserves framework, the key to the central
bank’s ability to influence interest rates is its
ability to forecast the demand for reserves and
nonpolicy factors tending to shift the supply of
reserves (Figure 3). That is, the central bank
needs to be able to offset shifts in the demand for
reserves or nonpolicy shifts in the supply of
reserves that might cause interest rates to deviate
from desired levels. For example, an increased
demand for reserves caused by faster deposit
growth would cause the demand curve in Figure
3 to shift out to the right to D¢ putting upward
pressure on the interest rate. To maintain the current
interest rate, r0, the central bank would have to
provide additional reserves, shifting the supply
curve to the right to S¢. In this framework, mistakes
in forecasting reserve demand or supply translate
into volatility of interest rates around desired levels.
In a world where reserve requirements are no
longer binding, financial markets could experi-
ence even greater interest rate volatility than in
a reserves environment due to the different nature
of the demand for settlement balances. As noted
in the previous section, this demand is funda-
mentally different from the demand for reserves.
The demand for settlement balances depends
largely on expected payments flows and institu-
tional features of the payments system which
affect the timing of payments. In contrast, the
demand for reserves is primarily derived from
the level of transactions balances on an institu-
tion’s balance sheet which, in turn, reflects both
the public’s need to make transactions and its
choice of financial assets. Because of these dif-
ferences, it is possible the demand for settlement
balances could be less stable and less predictable
than the demand for reserves.
17 If so, the central
bank may have greater difficulty in judging the
size of the open market operation needed to
achieve a given level of interest rates, resulting
in greater rate volatility.
In addition, the demand for settlement bal-
ances may be less sensitive to interest rates than
is the demand for reserves. This could happen if
institutions maintain only a small cushion of
precautionary balances above their clearing and
settlement needs, a cushion which is smaller
than institutions would hold under a system of
binding reserve requirements. With only a small
amount of precautionary balances, institutions
have less ability to absorb unexpected changes
in the size of their settlement balance at the
central bank. Faced with an unexpected shortfall
in settlement balances, for example, institutions
would be forced to obtain additional balances in
the overnight market, putting upward pressure
on interest rates.
If the demand for settlement balances is rela-
tively insensitive to interest rates, errors in
predicting either the demand for or supply of
these balances are likely to result in heightened
interest rate volatility. For example, in Figure 4,
suppose the central bank is targeting an interest
rate r0 and that there is an error in predicting the
amount of settlement balances supplied by non-
policy factors. That is, the supply of settlement
balances turns out to be S¢ rather than S. Market
rates will be pushed up as institutions scramble
for additional settlement balances, but the amount
of the increase will be larger the steeper or less
interest-sensitive is the demand curve for settle-
ment balances D¢. Similar results are obtained
for errors in forecasting the demand for settle-
ment balances. Thus, if the demand for settlement
balances is very insensitive to interest rates,
central banks may experience greater volatility
of short-term interest rates.
Greater interest rate volatility could be a con-
cern for a central bank for several reasons. Most
basically, volatility may make it difficult for a
central bank to implement policy through con-
trol over short-term interest rates. That is, it may
become more difficult for the central bank to
16 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYachieve a given interest rate target or operating
range. This, in turn, may make it harder for
financial markets to judge the stance of mone-
tary policy. Volatility is of greatest concern if it
is transmitted up the yield curve to longer-term
interest rates and prices of other financial assets.
In this situation, increased volatility could have
real economic effects if it influences spending
or investment planning decisions.
18
Managing greater interest rate volatility
If a move to lower reserve requirements results
in greater interest rate volatility, central banks
have a number of options to limit volatility. One
approach is to attempt to alter the interest sensitiv-
ity of the supply of settlement balances by
changing the operation of its discount or lending
facility.
19
If institutions can obtain additional settlement
balances from the central bank as market rates rise,
the availability of these funds will dampen the
increase in market rates (Figure 5). When the
central bank lends additional settlement balances
as interest rates rise, the supply curve for settle-
ment balances would be flatter S¢ rather than
vertical  S. For an unexpected shift in the demand
for settlement balances D¢, interest rates would
rise less with the flatter supply curve S¢ as settle-
ment balances provided through the discount














ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1996 17larly, a flatter supply curve would reduce rate
volatility for unexpected shifts in nonpolicy fac-
tors shifting the supply curve for settlement
balances.
21
In the limit, the central bank could make the
supply curve horizontal by altering the central
bank lending facility to provide unlimited bal-
ances at a penalty rate above the market rate.
This penalty discount or lending rate would
establish a ceiling on overnight interest rates
because institutions would never be willing to
pay more for settlement balances than this rate.
As shown in Figure 6, this type of lending facil-
ity would establish an upper bound rU to the
market rate, making the supply curve horizontal.
Similarly, the central bank could put a floor on
market rates by offering to purchase excess settle-
ment balances at below market rates. As shown
in Figure 6, if the central bank purchased excess
settlement balances at the rate rL, the supply of
settlement balances would become horizontal at
this rate, establishing a lower bound to market
rates. This procedure is equivalent to paying
interest on excess settlement balances.
Instead of changing the discount facility, an
alternative approach to limit interest rate vola-
tility is for the central bank to intervene in
financial markets using open-market operations.
By using open-market operations as frequently
as necessary during the day, the central bank can
maintain short-term interest rates within a narrow













18 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYfall in settlement balances pushes interest rates
to the upper limit of the desired trading range,
the central bank would purchase securities to
provide additional settlement balances. Simi-
larly, when excess settlement balances push
rates downward, the central bank would sell
securities to absorb settlement balances and pre-
vent interest rates from falling below the lower
limit of the target range.
While the central bank has several options to
limit interest rate volatility, market participants
may take steps on their own to reduce volatility.
For example, faced with greater volatility, insti-
tutions may decide to hold additional settlement
balances as a precaution against having to turn
to the market to adjust surpluses or deficiencies
in their settlement account. Such a response by
institutions could result in a greater degree of
interest sensitivity in the demand for settlement
balances which would tend to limit rate volatility.
Volatility: The U.S. experience
The declining level of required reserve bal-
ances in the United States in recent years has
raised concerns about the possibility of increased
volatility in short-term interest rates (Board of
Governors). To date, however, the United States
has not experienced a sustained rise in interest
rate volatility (Chart 3).
22 As illustrated by this
chart, volatility of the federal funds rate rose
sharply at the end of 1990 around the time of the











ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1996 19This increase was short-lived, however, as vola-
tility returned to more normal levels later in the
year. In contrast to 1990, there is little indication
of increased volatility at the time of the April
1992 cut in reserve requirements or, more recently,
with the spread of sweep accounts in 1995-96. 
The failure of volatility to rise in 1992 and in
1995-96 may be partly attributable to institu-
tional changes made by the Federal Reserve. In
1992, the Federal Reserve doubled the reserve
carryover provision, allowing institutions to carry
forward larger reserve excesses and deficiencies
into the next maintenance period. This action
was taken in an attempt to forestall an increase
in volatility similar to that which occurred in 1990
(Feinman). In addition, accounting rules for the
treatment of vault cash were modified in 1992
in an attempt to smooth the reserve adjustment
process (Feinman).
Another important factor that may have pre-
vented an increase in interest rate volatility
in recent years is a change in the behavior of
depository institutions. Specifically, as required
reserve balances at the Federal Reserve have
fallen in recent years, many depository insti-
tutions have established “clearing balances” at
the Federal Reserve or have increased the size
of existing clearing balances to serve as a
cushion against account overdrafts and to offset
service charges from the use of the Fed’s clear-
Unsmoothed
Chart 3
VOLATILITY OF THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE
Note: Mean absolute deviation of daily federal funds rate from intended rate by maintenance period. For details, see endnote 22.
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20 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYing, settlement, and other payments services.
Authorized under the Monetary Control Act of
1980, clearing balances allow institutions with-
out reserve balances or with reserve balances too
small for payments needs to use Federal Reserve
payments services. The decision to establish
these accounts and their size is largely voluntary.
Once the accounts are established, however,
they operate much like required reserve bal-
ances in the sense that institutions are penalized
for significant deficiencies to their clearing ac-
counts. That is, once a clearing balance account
is set up by an institution, the institution must
meet a clearing balance requirement. 
 Required clearing balances differ from required
reserve balances in two important ways. First,
required clearing balances are not tied to the
level of an institution’s transactions accounts
but, rather, to expected payments needs. Second,
clearing balances earn implicit interest in the
form of offsets to the cost of Federal Reserve
payments services.
23
Required clearing balances have grown consid-
erably in recent years (Chart 4). Indeed, growth
was especially rapid after the reductions in
reserve requirements in 1990 and 1992 and during
the growth of sweep accounts in 1995-96. The
growth in the use of clearing balances suggests
that depository institutions are offsetting reduc-
tions in required reserve balances, at least partially,
by establishing clearing balances at the Federal
Reserve.
24 Thus, increased reliance on clearing
Chart 4
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1996 21balances may have helped to prevent a rise in
interest rate volatility as required reserve balances
have declined.
While these factors likely help explain the
recent behavior of short-term interest rate vola-
tility in the United States, a third, more funda-
mental reason should not be overlooked.
Despite the decline in required reserve balances,
reserve requirements may still be binding on
enough depository institutions to limit volatility.
As noted earlier, approximately 2,000 institu-
tions still maintain required reserve balances at
the Federal Reserve. If current trends continue,
however, this situation may not last. Since
depository institutions began to use sweep
accounts at the beginning of 1994, the number
of institutions holding reserve balances has
fallen by more than 500. If this trend continues,
it may not be long before the United States is in
a world where reserve requirements are no longer
effective and interest rate volatility becomes a
more important concern. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Over the past decade, reserve requirements
have been reduced or eliminated in a number of
industrialized countries. Even where reserve
requirements have not been lowered, their effec-
tiveness has been reduced by financial innovation.
Thus, central banks increasingly find themselves
operating in an environment in which the tradi-
tional framework for implementing monetary
policy no longer applies.
The declining use of reserve requirements has
two important implications for monetary policy.
First, in a world without binding reserve require-
ments, there is a crucial link between the structure
of the payments system and monetary policy
operating procedures. Second, a system of low or
zero reserve requirements may generate greater
volatility of short-term interest rates. Both
implications present central banks with chal-
lenges in implementing monetary policy.
 This article, the first of two, has examined
some of the analytical issues that arise in moving
to a world where reserve requirements are no
longer binding. The companion article, to be
published in a future issue of the Review, dis-
cusses how three countries—Canada, the United
Kingdom, and New Zealand—conduct mone-
tary policy without reserve requirements and
examines whether similar procedures could be
implemented in the United States. 
ENDNOTES
1 In the United States, the basic structure of reserve
requirements is set out in the Monetary Control Act of
1980, and the Federal Reserve’s authority to adjust reserve
requirements is limited by this legislation. Depository
institutions in the United States currently face a 10 percent
reserve requirement on transactions account balances
in excess of $52 million and a 3 percent requirement on
transactions balances of $0 to $52 million. There is an
exemption for smaller institutions set out in the Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 that limits
the amount of transactions balances subject to the 3
percent requirement. Currently, there are no reserve
requirements on nonpersonal time deposits or
eurocurrency liabilities. 
2 For larger institutions, these two periods are overlapping
but not coincident. Reserve requirements are calculated on
the basis of the average daily level of transactions
deposits held during a period beginning on a Tuesday and
ending 14 days later on a Monday. The corresponding
reserve maintenance period begins on the Thursday
following the beginning of the calculation period and ends
14 days later on a Wednesday. Smaller institutions are
subject to a separate reserve maintenance and computation
scheme.
3 In the United States, depository institutions are allowed
to carry over an excess or deficiency of up to 4 percent of
required reserves into the next maintenance period.
22 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY4 In the United States, the monetary charge for an overnight
overdraft is 4 percentage points above the effective federal
funds rate on the day of the overdraft. Reserve deficiencies
for an entire maintenance period (beyond allowable
carryover) are charged at the rate of the discount rate on
adjustment credit plus 2 percentage points.
5 While this view is increasingly widespread, it is not
universal. For example, some countries, such as Germany
continue to view reserve requirements as an essential part
of monetary policy. Also, in small open economies, reserve
requirements are sometimes seen as a way to counteract
adverse capital flows (Bisignano). 
6 The shift in emphasis from a reserves operating procedure
to an interest rate operating procedure does not preclude
retaining a monetary aggregate as an intermediate target.
7 The small (.35%) reserve requirement in the United
Kingdom, officially termed the cash ratio, is viewed as
serving no monetary policy purpose; its sole function is to
provide income for the Bank of England (King). Other
countries currently operating without reserve requirements
include Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden.
8 All of these innovations can be viewed as ways of
avoiding reserve requirements and other regulatory
restrictions on bank behavior such as Regulation Q interest
rate ceilings.
9 More detailed discussion of sweep accounts and their
implications can be found in Federal Reserve Bank of New
York (1995) and Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
10 The demand for reserves will also depend on the public’s
holdings of term deposits in those countries in which term
deposits are subject to reserve requirements.
11 For simplicity, the supply curve (S) in Figure 1 is drawn
as a vertical line under the assumption that the only source
of reserves from the central bank is through open market
operations. If reserves are also available through a discount
window or central bank lending facility, the supply curve
would be positively-sloped or horizontal depending on the
administration of the discount window and the level of the
discount rate. In the United States, for example, where
access to the discount window is restricted and the discount
rate is generally below market rates, the supply of reserves
would be upward sloping. That is, as the market rate rises
above the discount rate, depository institutions have a
greater incentive to borrow reserves at the discount
window. In contrast, in a Lombard system such as that
found in Germany, the ready availability of reserves at a
penalty rate would result in a horizontal supply curve at the
Lombard rate. These points are discussed in more detail in
the final section of this article. 
12 Changes in payments practices could alter the demand
for excess reserves by changing the degree of uncertainty
of flows through an institution’s reserve account. 
13 For example, because governments generally hold their
main accounts at central banks, depository institutions will
also need to hold accounts at the central bank to transact
business with the government. In addition to a voluntary
demand for settlement balances driven by business needs,
institutions may be required to hold some settlement
balances at the central bank.
14 This point has been made by Freedman, Feinman, and
Bisignano, among others.
15 The supply curve for central bank balances is unchanged
by moving to a world without reserve requirements. That
is, the supply of central bank balances and its determinants
are unchanged whether these balances are labeled reserves
or settlement balances. 
16 The greater emphasis on interest rates in monetary
policy operating procedures in many countries is discussed
in Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh.
17 Whether the demand for settlement balances is
fundamentally more or less stable than the demand for
reserves is a difficult issue that must ultimately be decided
by empirical work. Certainly, financial innovations
affecting money demand have made it difficult to estimate
the demand for reserves in recent years. In the short run,
during the transition from a world of binding reserve
requirements to a world of settlement balances, however,
volatility is likely to be an especially serious issue because
it may take time to develop reliable models of the demand
for settlement balances. 
18 For evidence on the transmission of volatility to
longer-term rates, see Kasman; for further discussion, see
King.
19 There are also possibilities for the central bank to alter
the interest sensitivity of the demand for settlement
balances, for example, by changing the penalty structure
for overdrafts to induce institutions to hold additional
settlement balances. 
20 The operation of the central bank lending facility shown
in the supply curve (S¢) is similar to the current operation
of the Federal Reserve’s discount window. Specifically, for
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1996 23the supply curve to be upward-sloping, access to the
lending facility would have to be limited or institutions
would have to view balances obtained in the market to be
an imperfect substitute for balances obtained through the
central bank, perhaps because of a reluctance to borrow
funds from the central bank. Without these conditions, the
supply curve would be horizontal and the lending rate
would establish a ceiling to market rates.
21 Note, however, that the cushioning effect of this type of
lending facility can operate asymmetrically. Indeed, if the
demand curve D were to shift to the left rather than to the
right, the discount window would not cushion the fall in
the interest rate below r0. Thus, for this type of lending
facility to work symmetrically, the central bank would have to
consistently under-provide settlement balances through
open market operations, forcing institutions to use the
lending facility. In Figure 5, the central bank would want to
insure that the demand curve for settlement balances always
intersected the upward-sloping part of the supply curve S¢.
22 This chart shows one measure of the volatility of the
federal funds rate—the mean absolute deviation of the
daily effective funds rate from the intended rate over
two-week maintenance periods. To highlight trend
behavior, a smoothed series is shown along with the actual
data. The smoothed series was calculated by dividing the
data into bands of approximately quarterly frequency (six
maintenance periods) and calculating the median value for
each band. Data and further details are available from the
authors.
23 For a more complete discussion of clearing balances,
see Stevens (1993a) and Stevens (1993b).
24 The rise in clearing balances has not offset the decline
in required reserve balances. As a result, required operating
balances, the sum of required clearing balances and
required reserve balances, has declined as well. 
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